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We explore the relationship between CDS premia and bond asset swap spreads on the same 
reference entity. As Duffie (1999) shows, there is a clear theoretical link between CDS premia 
and bond prices if the two quantities are viewed as a pure measure of credit risk. However, 
many studies provide evidence that factors other than credit risk seem to affect bond prices 
and CDS premia, and these factors may partially obscure the relationship. We focus on the 
difference between the yield spread and the CDS premium, the bond-CDS basis, and show 
that the basis is highly sensitive to firm-specific and market wide credit risk and liquidity. If 
CDS and bonds are used in a dynamic hedging strategy or in a basis trading strategy that 
depends on the convergence of CDS and bond markets, it is necessary to correctly quantify 
the associated risks of these strategies.     3 
I. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between CDS premia and bond yield 
spreads on the same reference entity. As Duffie (1999) shows, there is a clear theoretical link 
between CDS premia and yield spreads if the two quantities are viewed as a pure measure of 
credit risk. If they are affected by additional risk sources - such as liquidity - these risk 
sources may partially obscure the relationship. Many studies provide evidence that factors 
other than credit risk seem to affect yield spreads and CDS premia. As an extreme case for the 
corporate bond sector, Elton et al. (2001) find that only 25% of the yield spread can be 
attributed to default risk. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) analyze corporate yield spread changes 
and show that these are closely associated with measures of aggregate bond market liquidity. 
For the CDS market, Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002) and Tang and Yan (2007) provide studies 
exploring the determinants of corporate CDS premia other than default risk. While the former 
authors claim that liquidity measured as market capitalization does not matter, the latter study 
finds a liquidity premium in CDS transaction premia that accounts for approximately 26% of 
the entire CDS premium.  
 
In this study, we focus on the difference between the yield spread and the CDS premium, 
known as the basis. We explore three potential reasons why the basis may deviate from 0. 
First, we  determine  whether  the issuer-specific credit risk  has an effect  on the  basis. If 
different default events or, in the terms prevalent in the CDS market, credit events are priced 
in bonds and CDS, the basis may well exhibit a sensitivity to measures of firm-specific credit 
risk. In this respect, we extend the empirical results by Packer and Zhu (2005) who show that 
CDS with broader credit event definitions trade at higher premia. Second, we analyze to 
which extent bond and CDS liquidity affect the basis. By simultaneously considering the 
impact of measures from the bond and the CDS market on the basis, we thus extend the 
evidence by Longstaff et al. (2005) who only analyze the impact of bond-specific variables on 
the non-default component of bond yield spreads.  Third, we explore whether aggregate 
market conditions affect the basis. In contrast to Zhu (2004) who focuses on interest rate 
levels and stock market data, we use interest rate levels, aggregate bond market index yield 
spreads, and a broad financial market liquidity indicator, and document a significant impact of 
the aggregate market conditions in addition to the firm-specific variables. 
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Due to our large data set, we are able to analyze financial and non-financial firms from 8 
different industry sectors and partition the sample into investment and subinvestment grade 
firms. A stratification of our sample according to the two main rating classes is obvious as 
there is a large difference in bond spreads between BBB and BB rated bonds. For CDS data, 
none of the above cited studies also consider subinvestment grade instruments as data on 
lower grade debt has traditionally been scarce. An exception is the study by Ericsson et al. 
(2005), but the authors do not differentiate by industry sectors. 
 
Whereas the majority of studies that analyze the consequences of credit risk on bond yield 
spreads and CDS premia do not discriminate between the financial and non-financial sector, 
we believe that such a distinction is relevant since financial firms are the major counterparties 
in the CDS market. Acharya and Johnson (2007) show that there is evidence of informed 
trading of banks in the CDS market. Because the trader's information regarding a financial 
underlying is better than for a non-financial one, CDS premia from the two sectors are likely 
to behave differently.  Düllmann and Sosinska (2007)  explore this hypothesis and find 
evidence for a weak link between CDS-implied default probabilities and expected default 
frequencies for banks. In their cross-sectional analysis, Longstaff et al. (2005) also document 
that the non-default component in bond yield spreads for financial firms is significantly larger 
than for non-financial firms. 
 
Our results extend the existing literature by showing that the basis is highly sensitive to firm-
specific and  market-wide risk  factors  and that this sensitivity differs for investment  and 
subinvestment grade as well as for financial and non-financial firms. Overall, we obtain three 
main results. First, we document an on average positive basis which implies that credit risk 
cannot be the only priced factor in CDS premia and bond yield spreads. The differences 
between yield spreads and CDS premia are smaller in the subinvestment grade segment which 
we take as a first indication that a higher firm-specific credit risk leads to an increasing 
convergence of the bond and the CDS market. 
 
Second, we study whether this cross-sectional observation also holds in a time-series analysis. 
The results of a vector error correction analysis show that the basis depends on different time-
varying factors. For one third of the sample, in particular for financial and investment grade 
firms, this impact is large enough to obscure the credit-risk induced comovement of yield   5 
spreads and CDS premia. This result stands in contrast to the finding by Blanco et al. (2005) 
who find a stable cointegration relation between the bond and the CDS market. 
 
Our third contribution is the attribution of the basis variation to firm-specific and market-wide 
risk measures. In a firm-specific fixed-effects analysis, we document that the way in which 
firm-specific credit risk is measured leads  to different sensitivities of the basis. Market-
implied measures have a stronger impact on the CDS market while the more easily available 
rating  information affects the bond market more strongly. Both the bond-  and the CDS-
specific  liquidity have a significant impact on the basis, thus extending  the evidence on 
illiquidity premia in the CDS market by Tang and Yan (2007) and Bühler and Trapp (2008). 
For non-financial firms, the basis is more sensitive towards the firm-specific explanatory 
variables, suggesting that financial  firms are more strongly affected by aggregate market 
conditions. 
 
Through extending the fixed-effects analysis to market-wide  explanatory variables, we 
demonstrate  that more adverse market conditions lead to a  decreasing  basis  and thus to 
converging yield spreads and CDS premia. We also find that the basis of financial firms is 
much more sensitive to interest rate levels than that  for non-financials.  This effect is of 
particular interest since  economically,  two contrary effects prevail: First, interest rates 
decrease in recessions and increase in boom phases. Therefore, higher interest rates indicate 
more favourable economic conditions and lower overall default risk. On the other hand, 
higher interest rates signify higher refinancing costs which may lead to an increase in default 
risk. Since these effects pertain at the firm-specific level, we would expect that yield spreads 
and CDS premia exhibit a similar sensitivity and that the basis is only marginally affected by 
interest rates. In our empirical analysis,  we document that CDS premia are consistently 
negatively related to interest rate levels. The interest rate sensitivity of bond yield spreads, on 
the other hand, depends on the industry segment. For non-financial firms, yield spreads also 
depend negatively on interest rates while yield spreads for financial firms increase for higher 
interest rates. This puzzling difference between the interest rate sensitivity of yield spreads 
and CDS premia for financial firms is a factor that can drive the two markets apart which 
makes an effective hedging strategy between bonds and CDS impossible.  
 
   6 
II. Data 
 
A. Bond Yield Spreads and CDS Premia 
 
All CDS and bond data is obtained from Bloomberg. CDS bid and ask premia were made 
available to us by a large international bank.  Mid bond prices were taken  directly from 
Bloomberg. We focus on CDS contracts and bonds that are denominated in Euro in order to 
obtain a  longer time series. Especially in the early phase of the CDS  market, Euro 
denominated CDS contracts are much more widely available: between June 2001 and October 
2001, we observe 119 Euro denominated CDS contracts versus 16 US-Dollar denominated 
CDS contracts. As the starting and end point, we use June 1, 2001 (there were no CDS quotes 
available prior to this date) and June 30, 2007 which yields a total of 1,548 trading days. 
Therefore, we exclude the turbulent market phase related to the subprime crisis. 
 
We only choose CDS quotes with a 5-year maturity in order to obtain a sample which is 
homogenous with regard to liquidity as discussed  by  Meng and ap Gwilym (2006)  and 
Gündüz et al. (2007). 
 
The default-free term structure of interest rates is provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank on a 
daily basis. The estimates are determined by the Nelson-Siegel-Svensson method from prices 
of German Government Bonds which represent the benchmark bonds in the Euro area for 
most maturities.  
 
For each firm, we collect the coupon, payment, and maturity dates of all senior unsecured 
Euro denominated straight bonds which were outstanding between June 1, 2001 and June 30, 
2007. We exclude all bonds with more than 10 years to maturity at a given date since the 
modified-modified restructuring clause which applies to most Euro  denominated CDS 
contracts only allows for delivery of restructured assets with a maturity of up to 5 years in 
excess of the maturity of the restructured asset. For these bonds, we collect the time series of 
daily mid price quotes from June 1, 2001 to June 30, 2007. 
 
For each bond, we determine the yield spread over the default-free interest rate and interpolate 
these to obtain a maturity identical to that of the CDS. We perform the following interpolation 
scheme: In the first step, we compute the time-t yield spread of each bond by minimizing the   7 
squared error of the bond’s observed dirty price and its theoretical price. This theoretical price 
is obtained by discounting each cash flow by the risk-free rate plus the credit spread. In the 
second step, we perform a linear regression of these yield spreads on the maturity of the bond 
for each of the trading days. The resulting daily estimates of the intercept and the slope are 
used to compute the theoretical yield spread of a synthetical bond with the same maturity as 
the CDS contract. This interpolation produces a more stable time-series of yield spreads than 
first interpolating the bond yields and then subtracting the yield-to-maturity of a default-free 
bond. 
 
If the matched time series of yield spreads and CDS premia has less than 20 observations on 
consecutive trading days, we exclude the firm from the sample. The final sample consists of 
CDS contracts on 155 firms for which bond mid price quotes are observed. The average 
length of the observation time series equals 806 trading days with a total of 131,222 CDS ask 
and bid quotes each and 497,254 bond prices. The distribution of the firms across the different 
rating classes and industry sectors is displayed in Table I. 
 
Insert Table I about here. 
 
Table I shows that 146 firms have a time-series average investment grade rating; only 9 lie in 
the subinvestment grade range. Nevertheless, we observe 8,581 CDS mid premia and 22,794 
bond yields for these 9 firms. In addition, more than 9 firms exhibit a subinvestment grade 
rating at some date in the observation interval. The largest industry sector, both regarding the 
number of firms and the number of observations, is the financial sector with 54 firms and 
175,870, respectively 38,046, bond yield and mid CDS premium observations. These numbers 
amount to 35% of the bond yield observations and 29% of the CDS premium observations. 
Moreover, financial firms are among the top-rated ones, constituting 34% of the investment 
grade firms. 
 
B. Firm-Specific Factors 
 
As firm-specific measures of credit risk, the firm's rating and variables derived from traded 
stocks and stock options are explored. First, we use Standard&Poor's (S&P) and Moody's 
ratings. In their empirical analysis, Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002) find that the rating is the major   8 
determinant of CDS premia. Its explanatory power lies at 40% for their entire sample and 
increases to 66% for the sovereign sub-sample. 
 
For each of the firms, we collect a complete rating history from Bloomberg between June 1, 
2001 and June 30, 2007. We map the daily ratings onto a numerical scale ranging from 1 to 
66 where 1 corresponds to the AAA*+ S&P rating (Aaa*+ Moody's rating), and the highest 
value, 66, corresponds to a D*- S&P rating (for Moody's, C*- is the lowest rating) which 
marks defaulted  firms with a negative outlook. If the numerical rating  of the two  rating 
agencies differs on a given day, we assign the average numerical rating to the firm, rounding 
up to the next integer. The highest resulting numerical rating equals 2 (AAA S&P rating) 
while the lowest rating in the sample is 50 (CCC+ S&P rating). 
 
However, the use of rating data as a credit risk measure can be problematic. First, rating 
agencies claim that their ratings are a through-the-cycle evaluation, and second, information 
on a borrower's creditworthiness may be reflected in  CDS premia before the rating is 
adjusted. An example supporting this concern by Hull et al. (2004) shows that CDS premia 
anticipate rating changes while only reviews for rating downgrades contain information that 
significantly affects the CDS market. 
 
As alternative credit risk proxies, we use the option-implied and the historical stock return 
volatility since these may provide  more accurate information on changes in a firm's 
creditworthiness in the short run. This hypothesis is supported by Cremers et al. (2004) and 
Benkert (2004)  who show that  historical and implied volatilities have an additional 
explanatory power in excess of the rating. For 3 fully state-owned and 6 private firms, no 
equity data was available. For the remaining 146 firms, we obtain a time series of ex-dividend 
stock prices and option-implied volatilities from Bloomberg. We use the implied volatilities 
of European vanilla at-the-money options with a maturity of 12 months since the data for 
these was most widely available. 
 
The impact of the credit risk measures on the basis is not clear ex ante since there is no 
theoretically compelling argument why either yield spreads or CDS premia should be more 
sensitive to either credit risk measure than the other. 
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We also explore the impact of bond and CDS liquidity. For the CDS, the bid-ask spread 
represents a direct liquidity proxy. We expect that the higher the bid-ask spread, the higher 
the illiquidity and the CDS mid premium. Choosing an appropriate proxy for the yield spread 
is more difficult as we do not have access to historical transaction data or quotes and thus no 
direct liquidity measures. Instead, we follow Houweling et al. (2004) who identify the impact 
of a number of liquidity measures on the yields of corporate bond portfolios. The authors find 
that among potential liquidity proxies including issued amount, age, and number of quote 
contributors, the bond yield volatility on a given date across a specific portfolio is one of the 
most powerful explanatory variables for the portfolio's liquidity. As the studies by Shulman et 
al. (1993)  and  Hong and Warga (2000), their  study shows that higher yield  volatility is 
associated with higher illiquidity and higher yields. We therefore expect a positive association 
between the volatility across a firm's bond yields on a given date and yield spreads. 
 
Regarding the impact of the liquidity proxies on the basis, it seems plausible that the sign of 
the coefficient estimates is positive for the yield volatility and negative for the bid-ask spread. 
However, the liquidity of the markets is linked both directly and indirectly which may affect 
the sign and size of the coefficient estimate for the basis. This liquidity link between the 
markets is due to two effects. First, CDS premia are directly affected by bond liquidity since a 
lower liquidity of a reference asset will in general decrease its price. Therefore, in case of 
default, the expected value transfer to the protection buyer (face value minus expected bond 
price after default) will increase. This increase will be anticipated by the protection seller who 
asks for a higher CDS premium. Second, credit risk can be taken on or sold off either directly 
by buying or selling the bond or indirectly by selling or buying protection in the CDS market. 
Therefore, it is possible that funds are drawn to either one market or the other which would 
cause increasing yield spreads in the bond market, and thus an increasing basis, due to an 
increasing CDS liquidity. On the other hand, a higher CDS liquidity may also have a yield 
spread reducing effect as the demand for credit risk in the bond market may increase due to 
the hedging potential through more liquid CDS. The results by Ashcraft and Santos (2007), 
however, suggest that this hedging effect is not likely to be dominant. 
 
C. Market-Wide Factors 
 
It is a well-documented finding that the level of the interest rate curve has a significant impact 
on the level and the changes of CDS premia and yield spreads. From a theoretical perspective,   10 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) argue that a higher spot rate increases the risk-neutral drift of 
the firm value and thus decreases the  default probability and yield spreads. Empirically, 
Duffee (1998)  observes that yield spreads decrease if the  level of the  Treasury curve 
increases. CDS premia also depend negatively on the interest rate level as Aunon-Nerin et al. 
(2002) and Benkert (2004) show. Therefore, the effect for the basis is not obvious. 
 
Economically, it is not  even  clear  whether these aggregate findings for bond and CDS 
markets hold for all industry sectors and rating segments for the following reason. On the one 
hand, the effect described by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) leads to negative associations of 
yield spreads and CDS premia with the interest rate. Also, default-free interest rates function 
as key rates in monetary policy. In recession phases, central banks lower interest rates to 
boost the economy and increase them in booms to prevent an overheating of the economy. 
Therefore, low interest rates coincide with recession phases marked by high yield spreads and 
CDS premia. On the other hand, higher interest rates make financing more costly, and in 
particular firms who depend on short-term financing such as commercial papers may be more 
sensitive towards their financing cost. This effect would cause a positive association between 
yield spreads, respectively CDS premia, and interest rates. 
 
We use the European Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR) instead of the government or swap 
rate in order to avoid endogeneity in the empirical analysis. We obtain the official daily 1-
month EURIBOR interest rates from the International Capital Markets Association (ICMA) 
website.  
 
As a measure of market-wide credit risk, we use a corporate bond  yield  spread  index. 
Empirical evidence for a relation between market-wide risk and yield spreads is given by 
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) who document a positive association between changes in the 
implied volatility of the S&P 500 index and yield spread changes. Ericsson et al. (2008) 
extend the analysis for CDS bid and ask quotes. The results of  Schueler and Galletto (2003) 
suggest that not only CDS premia and yield spreads are affected by the return of bond and 
stock market indices, but that the basis may also be affected. In order to extend the authors' 
anecdotal evidence, we include the S&P Creditweek Global Bond Index for which weekly 
yield spreads are available from Bloomberg. These yield spreads are determined with regard 
to a specific rating class from AAA to B and have a constant maturity of 5 years. They are 
therefore comparable both to the CDS premia and the interpolated firm-specific yield spreads.   11 
 
As a measure of market-wide liquidity, we use the European Central Bank (ECB) Financial 
Market Liquidity Indicator which aims at simultaneously measuring the liquidity dimensions 
price, magnitude, and regeneration by combining 8 individual liquidity measures for the Euro 
area. The time series and the description of the liquidity indicator were made available to us 
by the ECB. The first three measures which enter the indicator are proxies for the market 
tightness. The  fourth, fifth and sixth measures proxy for  market depth are.  The final 
components quantify the liquidity premium. The ECB describes that higher values of the 
liquidity indicator imply a higher market-wide liquidity. 
 
To conclude the data description, we provide a basic overview over  the mean, standard 
deviation, minimum, and maximum in Table II. 
 
Insert Table II about here. 
 
Panel A of Table II shows that yield spreads are about 65% larger than the CDS mid premia. 
For the entire sample, yield spreads fluctuate between -199.60 bp and 2,288.17 bp with a 
mean of 91.92 bp while CDS premia are consistently positive with a mean of 55.44 bp, a 
minimum of 3.00  bp, and a maximum of 1,874.88 bp. Consequently, the mean basis  is 
positive at 48.75 bp. This is a hint that yield spreads are higher and/or CDS premia are lower 
than if credit risk were the only priced factor in the two instruments. However, the relatively 
high  standard deviation of 121.22 bp and the minimum of -726.41 bp also  point at a 
significant proportion of negative values which implies that CDS premia also exceed yield 
spreads to a considerable amount. On comparing the investment to the subinvestment grade 
segment, we observe that the basis is on average smaller in the subinvestment grade segment 
with a mean of 18.32 bp compared to 50.29 bp. Clearly, the impact of credit risk on yield 
spreads and CDS premia is strong enough to dominate other effects for the subinvestment 
grade segment. Consequently, bonds and CDS become more similar, the higher the credit risk 
is. The basis for financial and non-financial industry sectors, on the other hand, differs less 
strongly with a mean basis of 40.74 bp for financial and 52.03 bp non-financial firms. 
 
Concerning the explanatory variables displayed in Panel B, the  firm-specific credit risk   
measure (the option-implied and, when unavailable, the historical stock return volatility) on 
average equals 22.66% with a lower value of 22.18% for the investment grade segment and a   12 
higher value of 35.52% for the subinvestment grade segment. Across the financial and the 
non-financial corporate sector, the average volatility is surprisingly similar, given that the 
financial companies tend to have a better rating. The bond liquidity measure has a mean value 
of 1.18%  and ranges between  0.00%  and 15.89%.  With a volatility of only 0.93%, the 
variability is rather small. The lower mean value of 1.15% for the investment grade segment 
compared to 1.95% for the subinvestment grade segment is consistent with the on average 
higher liquidity of highly rated bonds which Longstaff et al. (2005) and Bühler and Trapp 
(2008) document. In addition, the mean value of 1.62% for financial companies compared to 
1.00% for non-financial companies agrees with the evidence by Campbell and Taksler (2003) 
and Bedendo et al. (2007) that bonds for financial companies tend to be less illiquid than 
comparable bonds for non-financial companies. For CDS, the relation between the liquidity 
measure in the investment and the subinvestment grade segment is reverse to the one in the 
bond market. The mean value of  19.65%  in the investment grade segment  considerably 
exceeds the mean value of 8.22% in the subinvestment grade segment. Tang and Yan (2007) 
document a similar result in their study; the higher the credit risk of the underlying firm is, the 
higher is the CDS liquidity. For financial and non-financial companies, on the other hand, the 
relation is similar to that in the bond market with a higher mean value of 27.83% for the 
financial and of 15.54% for the non-financial sector. 
 
The market-wide explanatory variables are presented in Panel C.  The average 1-month 
EURIBOR lies at 2.81% p.a. with a standard deviation of 0.73%. Over time, we observe a U-
shaped interest rate time series, the maximum of 4.56% is attained on June 1, 2001, the 
minimum of 2.02% on March 29, 2004, and on the last observation date, the interest rate lies 
at 4.12%. A less pronounced U-shaped time series applies for the credit risk and the liquidity 
indices. The credit risk indices are maximal for all rating classes during the beginning of the 
observation interval with a maximum of 7.39% in the B rating class in the week of October 
10, 2001 and a subsequent decrease with the minimum of -0.30% for the AAA rating class in 
the week of June 6, 2003. The liquidity index first  decreases from around -0.20 at the 
beginning of the observation interval to a minimum of -0.55 on January 3, 2003 and then 
increases almost consistently. Since higher values of the index are associated with a higher 
market-wide liquidity, this behaviour points at an overall increasing liquidity starting from 
early 2003. 
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III. Time-Series Properties 
 
We now explore the connection between the time series of yield spreads and CDS premia for 
each firm. If credit risk is the main priced factor, we should find a close comovement of yield 
spreads  and  CDS premia. The theoretical relationship  has first been explored by Duffie 
(1999), and numerous empirical studies such as Hull et al. (2004) and Blanco et al. (2005) 
have documented a positive covariance, respectively a negative cointegration, of the yield 
spread and CDS premia time series. This relation should still hold if the factors which lead to 
differences between CDS premia and yield spreads do not exhibit a high amount of variation 
over time, e.g. if they indicate the market on which the instrument is traded. If, on the other 
hand, we do not find a significant cointegration relation  between CDS premia and yield 
spreads, it is natural to ask which factors can obscure the credit-risk induced relationship. 
 
In order to explore the relation between the yield spreads and CDS premia, we estimate a 
vector error correction model (VECM). To ensure that the VECM is applied correctly, we 
proceed in three steps. First, we apply the augmented Dickey-Fuller test on daily data for each 
company k. If the yield spreads and CDS premia exhibit a different order of integration at the 
10% level, we exclude the firm from the time-series analysis because a relation between 
stationary and non-stationary variables is difficult to interpret economically. This procedure 
leads to the exclusion of 52 firms. Second, we perform the Johansen test to determine whether 
the yield spread and CDS premia are cointegrated. If cointegration is not rejected at the 10% 
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Insert Table III about here. 
 
As Table III shows, only 92 out of the 155 firms exhibit a significant cointegration relation 
between yield spreads and CDS  premia. The negative average cointegration  coefficient 
estimate of -5.34 points at a comovement of yield spreads and CDS premia, but the high 
standard deviation across the  significant coefficient estimates of 32.99 suggests that this 
relation differs strongly across firms. For 28 firms, we obtain individual coefficient estimates 
that are larger than 0. This suggests that CDS premia and yield spreads move in the opposite 
direction, an effect that cannot be due to credit risk. The average error correction coefficient 
estimates of -0.13 for the yield spread changes and of 0.02 for CDS premia changes suggest 
that yield spreads are affected more strongly by deviations from the long-run relation. Thus, 
credit risk changes are first reflected in CDS premia. This result is also supported by the 
higher number of significant coefficient estimates a
k
ys for yield spread changes (45 versus 19).  
 
Across the different  rating classes, the proportion of significant  cointegration coefficient 
estimates is higher for the investment grade segment with 89 out of 146 compared to 3 out of 
9. Simultaneously, the average coefficient estimate is higher (on an absolute level) for the 
investment grade segment. This agrees with the on average higher basis for the investment 
grade segment. For the different industry sectors, the average coefficients and their standard 
deviations differ strongly for financial and non-financial firms even though the proportion of 
cointegrated yield spreads and CDS premia is similar. For financial firms, the cointegration 
coefficient estimate equals -10.54 while the estimate for non-financial firms lies at -2.44. The 
asymmetry between significantly affected yield spread and CDS premia changes is also larger 
for financial firms, suggesting that information discovery  takes place mostly in the CDS 
market. This finding points at a higher impact of non-credit risk factors on yield spreads than 
on CDS premia and supports the hypothesis that liquidity plays a more important role for 
bonds than for CDS.  
 
IV. Explaining the Basis 
 
To explore the determinants of the difference between yield spreads and CDS premia, we 
perform a regression analysis. As the basis  time  series are frequently  non-stationary, we 
cannot use OLS to determine the impact of the explanatory variables. A standard way to cope   15 
with this problem is the use of first differences instead of levels. This procedure, however, has 
the drawback that the results become more difficult to interpret economically. 
 
We therefore analyze the impact of the explanatory variables in a fixed-effects framework. 
This type of model is used to explore the impact of a time-invariant, unobserved effect that is 
potentially correlated with the explanatory variables on the dependent variable.
1
 
 Since the 
fixed-effects formulation allows us to pool the basis observations in levels across all firms, 
the size coefficient estimates are economically more intuitive.  
A. Firm-Specific Measures 
 
We first determine how firm- and instrument-specific measures of credit risk and liquidity 










t t defines the basis for firm k at time t. f
k
0 is the time-invariant firm-specific 
fixed  effect.  r
k
t  and  vol
k
t  refer to the rating and option-implied  volatility (replaced, if 




t are the proxies for the CDS 
and the bond liquidity as described in Section II.B. In order to avoid endogeneity, we use the 
liquidity proxies two business days prior to t. 
 
We determine the significance of the coefficient estimates using the Newey-West covariance 
estimate to adjust for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.
2 We subsequently test whether 




results of the estimation are given in Table IV. 
Insert Table IV about here. 
 
As Table IV shows, for the entire sample all credit risk and liquidity measures significantly 
affect the basis at the 1% significance level. Interestingly, the coefficient signs of the rating 
and the volatility measure differ: While the rating has  a  positive impact, the volatility 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Wooldridge (2002), p. 252. 
2 See Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997), pp. 534-535. 
3 See Enders (1995), pp. 239-240. 
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decreases the basis. Since both,  a higher numerical rating and a higher option-implied 
volatility, are associated with higher credit risk, this finding shows that yield spreads are more 
rating-sensitive, while CDS premia are more sensitive to the option-implied volatility. With 
regard to the liquidity proxies, we observe that lower bond liquidity increases the basis while 
lower CDS liquidity decreases it. In the full sample, an increase of the numerical rating by 
one increases the basis by 3 bp while a volatility increase by one percentage point decreases 
the basis by 0.5 bp. In comparison, an increase of the CDS bid-ask spread by one basis point 
decreases the basis by 0.8 bp, and an increase of the yield volatility by one percentage point 
increases the basis by 12 bp. 
 
The adjusted  R
2  lies  at 15.60%, which, taking into account that the basis  measures the 
difference between two quantities often viewed as identical, is rather large. If we repeat the 
analysis univariately (the results are suppressed for brevity), we obtain coefficient estimates 
with the same sign as in the multivariate model. The univariate adjusted R
2 ranges between 
13.18%  for the rating and  10.85%  for the CDS liquidity measure, suggesting that all 
quantities have a significant impact and explanatory power. However, the differences between 
yield spreads and CDS premia are clearly not entirely due to credit risk and liquidity. 
 
Comparing the estimation results for the investment and the subinvestment grade segment in 
Table IV, we observe that the coefficient signs remain unchanged from those for the entire 
sample. Except for the CDS liquidity coefficient, the  absolute value of the coefficient 
estimates and the adjusted R
2 are larger for the subinvestment grade segment which points at 
more strongly credit risk and liquidity-related differences between yield spreads and CDS 
premia. In the next section, we will explore whether the differences for the investment grade 
segment can be attributed to different sensitivities to market-wide measures. 
 
With regard to the different industry sectors in Table IV, we observe that the credit risk and 
liquidity measures have a higher explanatory power for the non-financial sector as measured 
by the higher  adjusted R
2  of  19.75%. An interesting difference between the two sectors 
concerns the impact of the rating which becomes insignificant for the financial sector as CDS 
premia and yield spreads exhibit a similar rating sensitivity. The effect of the CDS liquidity, 
on the other hand, is stronger for the financial sector as measured by the higher coefficient 
estimate. Recall that in  Table II, both the mean and the standard  deviation of the CDS 
liquidity measure for the financial sector exceed those for the non-financial sector. Therefore,   17 
a higher proportion of the basis variation is due to CDS liquidity for the financial sector than 
for the non-financial sector. 
 
To summarize, we find that firm-specific credit risk measures can have two effects on the 
basis which points at different sensitivities. While the bond market reacts more sensitively to 
the rating, the CDS market reflects the market-implied credit risk measure more strongly. 
This is in line with the intuition that CDS traders are sophisticated financial institutions while 
bond investors may have to rely on more easily available measures such as the rating. In 
addition, we document a significant impact of the bond and CDS liquidity measures on the 
basis and thus show that the commonly held view of a perfectly liquid CDS market is not 
supported by the data. The adjusted R
2 is largest for the subinvestment grade segment and for 
non-financial firms. Even though the basis is lower for the subinvestment grade segment, this 
segment is more sensitive to credit risk and liquidity, and the two risk factors explain a larger 
part of the basis. Therefore, the higher the credit risk - as measured by a lower rating – the 
stronger is the difference between the impact of the firm-specific risk factors. Both investment 
grade and financial firms, on the other hand, may be more sensitive to market-wide than to 
firm-specific conditions. We explore this hypothesis in the next section.  
 
B. Market-Wide Measures 
 
In an extension of the firm-specific analysis, we now explore whether the basis exhibits a 
rating and industry-sector specific dependency on the market-wide risk measures described in 















t are defined as in Equation (2). EURIBORt denotes the 1-month 
EURIBOR level, SPWC
k
t is the S&P Creditweek Global Bond Index yield spread for the 
rating class of firm k, and FMLt the liquidity index at date t. The results of the estimation are 
given in Table V. 
 
Insert Table V about here. 
 
As Table V shows, the market-wide explanatory variables have a significant impact on the 
basis  in excess of the  firm-specific variables, but the additional explanatory power is 
= ++ + + + + + + 01 2 3 4 5 6 7 ,    (3)
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relatively small. For the entire sample, the sign and significance of the coefficient estimates 
for the firm-specific variables are unaffected by the inclusion of the market-wide variables. 
Overall, the interest rate level has a positive impact, i.e. increasing interest rate levels result in 
larger differences between the bond and the CDS market. A separate analysis of yield spreads 
and CDS premia reveals that the coefficient estimate for the interest rate level is negative for 
both. The estimate of 11.34 for the entire sample thus implies a higher CDS premia interest 
rate sensitivity.  Therefore, for yield spreads the positive effect that is due to higher 
refinancing costs seems to be more important than for CDS premia. 
 
Higher overall credit risk, reflected by a higher value of SPWC, decreases the basis and thus 
the differences between the bond and the CDS market. Higher financial market liquidity, 
proxied by higher values of FML, increases the basis while lower financial market liquidity 
decreases the basis. Therefore, CDS premia and yield spreads  behave more similarly in 
adverse market conditions. With an adjusted R
2 of 16.49% compared to 15.60% in Table IV, 
the market-wide variables only have a very limited additional explanatory power.  
 
For the different rating classes, we observe from Table V that including the market-wide 
explanatory variables affects the investment and the subinvestment grade segment differently. 
First, the coefficient estimate for the impact of yv becomes significantly negative at -2.11 
compared to 5.04 in Table IV. The coefficient estimate for SPWC, on the other hand, is 
significantly positive at 2.40 compared to the estimate of -2.22 for the entire sample. A more 
detailed analysis of the investment-grade rating classes reveals that the negative coefficient 
estimate is driven by the AAA and AA rating class. For both rating classes, market-wide 
credit risk negatively affects CDS premia and yield spreads, and the coefficient estimate for 
CDS premia is more strongly negative. Therefore, the joint impact for the basis is positive 
due to a more pronounced effect in the CDS market.  
 
For the subinvestment grade segment, the impact of the interest rate level is negative with a 
coefficient estimate of -19.26 which  implies a tightening basis  when interest rates rise. 
Analysing the CDS premia and yield spreads separately reveals that, as expected, the positive 
coefficient estimate is due to a higher, i.e. more strongly negative, interest rate sensitivity of 
yield spreads than of CDS  premia, compared to the higher sensitivity of CDS in the 
investment grade segment.  
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Comparing the increase in the explanatory power for the investment and subinvestment grade 
reveals the surprising result that the increase is larger, both on an absolute and a relative scale, 
for the subinvestment grade segment. A separate analysis for CDS premia and yield spreads 
again allows us to attribute this result to the higher explanatory power of the market-wide 
explanatory variables for yield spreads in the subinvestment grade segment.  
 
The final results of Table V  concern the  differences between the financial and the non-
financial sector. While the coefficient estimates for the non-financial sector resemble those for 
the  entire sample, for the financial sector including the market-wide  variables leads to 
changes in the impact of the firm-specific variables. First, the coefficient estimates for the 
rating and the bond liquidity become significant and negative at -2.27 and -3.90 which is due 
to a high negative association with the yield  spreads  ys
k
t. This finding is especially 
noteworthy since market-wide credit risk only affects the basis significantly at the 10% level, 
and the impact of market liquidity is insignificant at the 10% level. Therefore, the different 
sensitivity to the firm-specific quantities and the higher adjusted R
2 can be attributed to the 
impact of the interest rate on yield spreads.   
 
The coefficient estimate for the interest rate of 29.84 is due to a positive coefficient estimate 
for yield spreads of 26.34. Since financial firms are more likely to refinance themselves at an 
interest rate close to EURIBOR, we believe that  this positive relation indicates their 
sensitivity towards refinancing costs. In particular commercial banks, who traditionally invest 
in longer-term risky assets and refinance themselves via short-term liabilities, tend to hold 
fixed-interest rate assets and liabilities  with diverging  maturities. Therefore, increasing 
interest rates decrease the value of the fixed-income assets to a larger extent than the short-
term liabilities, leading to higher credit risk and higher yield spreads. As Czaja et al. (2006) 
argue, this effect pertains to most financial institutions and makes them more sensitive to 
interest rate risk. However, it is puzzling why yield spreads reflect this firm-specific 
refinancing cost effect more strongly, while CDS premia reflect the business cycle effect 
more strongly. One potential explanation is that yield spreads contain a systematic component 
that is neither due to credit risk nor to liquidity – both of which we adjust for - which is 
positively associated with interest rates.  A second potential explanation lies in different 
default events which are priced in CDS and bonds such as restructuring, which in particular 
for financial firms is more likely than failure to pay or bankruptcy. 
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To summarize, the analysis in this section shows that the entire sample is relatively robust 
against including market-wide explanatory variables. On average, deteriorating overall market 
conditions (lower interest rates due to central bank intervention, higher credit risk, lower 
liquidity) are associated with a decreasing basis and thus with converging yield spreads and 
CDS premia. For the subsamples, on the other hand, we observe significant differences. First, 
we find  a  negative credit risk sensitivity  in the highest investment grade segment  which 
affects the CDS market more strongly than the bond  market. Second, yield spreads for 
financial firms have a positive dependence on interest rate levels which we attribute to the 
impact of refinancing costs. Third, the increase in explanatory power is largest for the 
subinvestment grade segment and the financial sector, suggesting that differences between the 
bond and the CDS market for these can partly be explained by a  different sensitivity to 
market-wide factors, in particular the interest rate. 
 
V. Summary and Conclusion 
 
The purpose of our paper is to explore which factors drive the differences between yield 
spreads and CDS premia. In order to adjust for the different maturity schemes, we determine 
yield spreads which we interpolate to a 5-year maturity. We then compute the basis as the 
difference between the interpolated yield spread and the mid CDS premium. 
 
Our results imply that for a broad sample of 155 firms with an average rating between AAA 
and CCC, CDS premia are lower, respectively yield spreads are higher, than if credit risk 
were the only priced factor. The basis is therefore mostly positive with an average of 48.75 
bp.  
 
A VECM analysis reveals that the differences are not mainly due to different levels of yield 
spreads and CDS premia but caused by the impact of differentiating time-varying factors. For 
63 firms, to a large proportion financial ones, the impact of these factors is strong enough to 
allow us to reject the hypothesis of a cointegration relation between CDS premia and yield 
spreads. Even for the 92 firms with a significant cointegration relation, the relation is not 
necessarily stable  which we deduce from the  insignificant error correction coefficient 
estimates. For those firms for which at least one estimate is significant, we find that the bond 
market is more likely to  react to the CDS market. This  finding points at a unilateral 
information spillover from the CDS to the bond market, particularly for financial firms.   21 
 
In order to explore the dependency of the basis on firm-specific and market-wide risk factors, 
we perform a fixed-effects regression analysis. We document a significant impact of bond- 
and CDS-related liquidity measures on the basis, thus extending the empirical evidence of 
Tang and Yan (2007), and show that a lower liquidity in the bond market causes CDS premia 
and yield spreads to drift apart. The impact of the credit risk measures on the basis differs, 
depending on which measure we use. The rating affects yield spreads more strongly than CDS 
premia and thus has a positive  impact on the basis. The  market-derived option-implied 
volatility, on the other hand, affects CDS premia more strongly than yield spreads and thus 
has a negative impact on the basis. Non-financial firms exhibit a higher adjusted R
2 than 
financial ones which implies that firm-specific conditions have a similar impact on CDS 
premia and yield spreads in the financial sector. 
 
Including market-wide explanatory variables in the fixed-effects analysis allows us to explore 
the impact of aggregate market conditions. In general, the results imply that adverse market 
conditions, proxied by lower interest rates, a higher bond index yield spread, and a lower 
value of the market-wide liquidity indicator, lead to a decreasing basis and thus to converging 
yield spreads  and  CDS  premia. Comparing different rating classes and  industry sectors, 
however, we find that this convergence is not given for all firms. Highly rated firms exhibit a 
negative credit risk sensitivity which affects CDS premia more strongly than yield spreads, 
thus CDS premia and yield spreads drift apart for these firms when credit risk increases. For 
financial firms, the basis displays a high dependence on the interest rate level which we 
attribute to a positive dependence of the yield spread due to a higher refinancing risk.  
 
Overall, our results shed light on the strongly discussed relation between the bond and the 
credit derivatives market. If CDS and bonds are used in a dynamic hedging strategy or, as 
hedge funds frequently do, in a basis trading strategy that depends on the convergence of 
CDS and bond markets, it is necessary to correctly quantify the associated risks of these 
strategies. We document in our time-series analysis that the convergence is by no means 
reliable. Instrument-specific liquidity in particular can cause yield spreads and CDS premia to 
drift apart, and while the basis on average decreases in adverse market conditions, we also 
find that more highly rated firms and firms from the financial sector can effectively exhibit 
more strongly diverging CDS premia and yield spreads when market-wide risk is high. 
   22 
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Table I: Firms by Rating Class and Industry Sector 
 
The table presents the number of firms in each rating class and industry sector. Ratings are averages for the firm over all dates on which both CDS ask and bid premia and at least 
two bond prices were observed. The last columns and rows show the number of mid bond prices and mid CDS premia for each rating class and industry sector between June 1, 
2001 and June 30, 2007. 
 
                          AAA     AA     A      BBB     BB     B       All          # Obs. Bonds  # Obs. CDS 
                       
Basic Materials             -   2  4  7  2  1    16    33,393  13,079 
Communication               -   1  7  8  3    -      19    73,211  20,481 
Cycl. Cons. Goods           -   2  3  9  2    -      16    47,497  15,634 
Noncycl. Cons. Goods        -       -   5  8  1    -      14    40,519  12,319 
Diversified                 -       -   2  2     -     -      4    6,536  3,096 
Financial                   -   22  28  4     -     -      54    175,870  38,046 
Industrial                  -       -   4  5     -     -      9    40,624  9,531 
Utility                1  5  13  4     -     -      23    79,604  19,036 
                       
All                    1  32  66  47  8  1    155    497,254  131,222 
                       
# Obs. Bonds          3,552  106,206  116,359  248,343  21,238  1,556    497,254                             
# Obs. CDS            1,085  27,015  53,203  41,338  7,842  739    131,222                                26 
 
 
Table II: Descriptive Statistics 
 
The table shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of each data category. The CDS mid 
premia, the interpolated bond yield spreads, and the basis are measured in basis points. The volatility is the 
option-implied volatility of at the money options with a 12-months maturity and, when this is unavailable, the 
historical stock return volatility, computed for stock returns in percentage points, over 12 months. The bond 
liquidity is the standard deviation of all observed bond yields for a given firm on a given date for yields in 
percentage points. The CDS liquidity is the bid-ask spread relative to the mid CDS premium, EURIBOR is the 1-
month European Interbank Offered Rate, SPWC is the S&P Bond Index yield spread, all in percentage points. 
FML is the Financial Market Liquidity Indicator as determined by the European Central Bank. 
 
                    AAA-BBB  BB-CCC     Financial  Non-
Financial 
  All 
                   
      Panel A: Dependent Variables 
                   
Yield Spread    Mean                 93.05  327.69     59.81  122.58     91.92 
             Std. Dev.                123.83  311.91     126.63  151.66     126.74 
             Min.                     -199.60  -20.56     -195.54  -199.60     -199.60 
             Max.                     1,603.09  2,288.17     1,380.78  2,288.17     2,288.17 
                   
CDS          Mean                     42.69  309.46     19.03  70.30     55.44 
             Std. Dev.                57.10  246.82     18.25  110.15     96.19 
             Min.                     3.00  38.50     3.00  5.33     3.00 
             Max.                     1,393.75  1,874.88     310.00  1,874.88     1,874.88 
                   
Basis        Mean                     50.29  18.32     40.74  52.03     48.75 
             Std. Dev.                115.99  195.84     127.71  118.30     121.22 
             Min.                     -516.48  -726.41     -217.97  -726.41     -726.41 
             Max.                     1,573.93  1,462.31     1,375.71  1,573.93     1,573.93 
                   
      Panel B: Firm-Specific Explanatory Variables 
                   
Volatility   Mean                     22.18  35.52     21.37  23.07     22.66 
             Std. Dev.                3.90  9.89     3.69  5.20     4.94 
             Min.                     7.69  22.17     9.33  7.69     7.69 
             Max.                     46.51  64.35     32.74  64.35     64.35 
                   
Bond Liq.    Mean                     1.15  1.95     1.62  1.00     1.18 
             Std. Dev.                0.86  1.92     0.83  0.90     0.93 
             Min.                     0.00  0.00     0.01  0.00     0.00 
             Max.                     15.89  12.85     15.89  12.85     15.89 
                   
CDS Liq.     Mean                     19.65  8.22     27.83  15.54     19.10 
             Std. Dev.                11.33  5.01     11.16  9.35     11.37 
             Min.                     0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00     0.00 
             Max.                     160.00  42.43     160.00  158.62     160.00 
                   
      Panel C: Market-Wide Explanatory Variables     
                                       Mean         Std. Dev.         Min.           Max.         
EURIBOR                               2.81  0.73     2.02  4.56      
SPWC                                  2.59  1.83     -0.3  7.39      





Table III: The Dynamic Relation of CDS Premia and Bond Yield Spreads   
             
The table presents the estimated coefficients for the vector error correction model in Equation (1). ys
k
t is the 
synthetic yield spread for a bond with a 5-year maturity, cds
k
t is the CDS mid premium for a 5-year maturity. 
The dependent variables are the yield spread and CDS premium changes, the explanatory variables are the vector 





t) and the lagged changes. b





cds the coefficient estimates of the error correction term. The top row displays the number of firms for which a) 
an identical order of integration could not be rejected at the 10% level, b) the Johansen test could not reject 
cointegration of the time series at the 10% level, c) the augmented Dickey-Fuller test could reject a unit root in 
the residuals of the VECM at the 10% level. Coefficients are given for premia in basis points.     
 
                             AAA-BBB  BB-CCC     Financial  Non-Financial    All 
                 
# Firms                     89  3     33  59    92 
                 
Mean b
k     -5.48  -1.07     -10.54  -2.44    -5.34 
Std. Dev. b
k     33.54  1.49     52.38  13.04    32.99 
# sign.                     89  3     33  59    92 
                 
Mean a
k
ys     -0.13  -0.05     -0.15  -0.11    -0.13 
Std. Dev. a
k
ys     0.16  0.02     0.18  0.15    0.16 
# sign.                     42  3     12  33    45 
                 
Mean a
k
cds     0.02  0     0.05  0    0.02 
Std. Dev. a
k
cds     0.15  0.01     0.25  0.03    0.15 
# sign.                     18  1     4  15    19 
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Table IV: Impact of Firm-Specific Factors 
 
The table shows the coefficients, significance level, and adjusted R
2 for the fixed effects model in Equation (2). 
The first row gives the number of firms for which the hypothesis of a unit root in the basis regression residuals 






t in basis points. r 
denotes the numerical rating, vol the option-implied volatility (replaced, if unavailable, by the historical stock 
return volatility) in percentage points, ba the CDS liquidity proxy in basis points, and yv the bond liquidity proxy 
in percentage points. ***, **, and * denote the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level for a t-test using Newey-
West errors. Adjusted R
2 are in percentage points. 
 
                                 AAA-
BBB 
  BB-CCC       Financial    Non-
Financial 
    All   
                         
# Firms                         137    7      48    96      144   
                         
r                              3.08  ***  6.47  ***    -0.14    3.70  ***    2.93  *** 
vol  -0.37  ***  -0.68  ***    -0.30  ***  -0.54  ***    -0.44  *** 
ba                             -1.64  ***  -1.27  ***    -2.33  ***  -0.80  ***    -0.80  *** 
yv                             5.04  ***  33.10  ***    8.43  ***  10.01  ***    12.36  *** 
                         
Adj. R





Table V: Impact of Market-Wide Factors 
 
The table shows the coefficients, significance level, and adjusted R2 for the fixed effects model in Equation (3). 
The first row gives the number of firms for which the hypothesis of a unit root in the basis regression residuals 






t in basis points. r, 
vol, ba, and yv are as in Table IV. EURIBOR denotes the 1-month EURIBOR level, SPWC the rating-class 
specific S&P Bond Index yield spread, both in percentage points, and FML the ECB Financial Market Liquidity 
Indicator. ***, **, and * denote the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level for a t-test using Newey-West errors. 
Adjusted R
2 are in percentage points.   
                   
                                 AAA-
BBB 
  BB-CCC       Financial    Non-Financial      All   
                         
# Firms                         144    9      52    101      153   
                         
r                             1.48  ***  7.48  ***    -2.27    3.40  ***    2.06  *** 
vol  -0.56  ***  -0.20  ***    -0.39  ***  -0.46  ***    -0.41  *** 
ba                             -1.69  ***  -0.93  ***    -2.83  ***  -0.71  ***    -0.57  *** 
yv                             -2.11  ***  32.93  ***    -3.90  ***  9.88  ***    8.91  *** 
                         
EURIBOR  14.06  ***  -19.26  ***    29.84  ***  5.43  ***    11.34  *** 
SPWC  2.40  ***  -5.84  ***    -1.53  *  -2.56  ***    -2.22  *** 
FML  5.31  ***  143.54  ***    0.55    12.60  ***    18.62  *** 
                         
Adj. R
2                       17.07    35.17      14.24    20.01      16.49   
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